The Knowledge Argument was proposed by Frank Jackson in 1982. It revolves around concepts of physicalism and qualia. Physicalism is the idea that "the real world consists simply of the physical world", meaning that all knowledge about everything can be understood in physical concepts. Qualia is defined as "a quality or property as perceived or experienced by a person." In other words, Qualia are mental concepts which are indescribable; practically unfathomable unless personally experienced. Philosophy is all about forming one belief and then proposing a persuasive argument on why that belief is correct. Following that, Jackson proposed a thought experiment known as "Mary's Room" by which he intended to prove against physicalism.
The experiment considers an intelligent neurologist named Mary. Mary has studied everything about colour vision. She knows all the characteristics of every colour. She also knows all about the biology and physics involved in it. She knows which wavelengths stimulate the retina of an eye and how. She is an expert on colour vision. However, Mary has always lived in a black-and-white room. All objects are black-and-white, all her study material is black-and-white and even her television is black-and-white. Everything she has seen has been monochromatic.
One day, Mary's TV malfunctions and it shows a coloured apple. The thought experiment begs the question: When Mary sees the red apple, does she gain any new knowledge?
Physicalists argue:
Since all concepts of the world can be understood and explained in explicit terms, Mary already knew everything about the colour.
Since she knew everything about the colour, her brain could already piece together every aspect of seeing a colour even though she never really experienced it.
Conclusively, she does not gain any new knowledge.
Those for the Knowledge Argument i.e. Jackson's initial argument about Qualia argue:
Since Mary knows all physical and explicit information about colour, Mary knows every physical aspect of the colour.
Since there are aspects of colour and its vision that are not physical or explicit (qualia), Mary lacks certain information about the colour.
Conclusively, she does gain new knowledge.
The above has been presented in the format that philosophical arguments are meant to follow: First Premise (P1) with First Consequence (C1), Second Connecting Premise (P2) with Second Consequence (C2) and Final Consequence (C3). As is always with Philosophy, there are further objections and additions to these arguments.
Thomas Nagel supported the Knowledge Argument with his philosophy of knowing 'what it is like' to experience something (1974). Following his idea, one can say that Mary never knew what it is like to see colour. She only knew all about what the brain does when it sees colour. She only knew that apples look red to people because she had read accounts of other people describing the same. This is explained by considering a second thought experiment including Marianna. She has the same premise as Mary: having lived in a black-and-white world and knowing all about colour vision. However, contrary to Mary, Marianna is not exposed to colour as directly as Mary was. She is first introduced to colours in abstract settings, essentially just seeing the colours (paint strokes of red) instead of objects of colour (red apple). At this point, Marianna fails to relate her knowledge of seeing red objects specifically with seeing colour. Marianna has had the experience of seeing colour generally but she does not know what it is like to see red colour. In the final step, Marianna is released (as was Mary) and finally gets to see a red apple. Now, she knows what it is like to personally see the colour red. Hence, Mary does gain new knowledge.
Philosophers against the Knowledge Argument have employed various ideas including one called 'No Propositional Knowledge' meaning no factual information. It is important to note that all physicalist arguments are based on the premise that physical explicit knowledge is considered fact. Extending the aforementioned, David Lewis (1983) and Lauren Nemirow (1980) proposed The Ability Hypothesis. This states that the above-mentioned argument of experiencing 'what it is like' is not knowledge but rather an ability. Lewis stated, "Knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize. […] It isn’t knowing-that. It’s knowing-how" Hence, Mary does not gain any new knowledge.
The Knowledge Argument and Mary's Room have fundamental effects on humanity's approach to acquiring knowledge and what we consider knowledge in the first place. For illustration, let us consider a more realistic example. Can a scientist know everything about space without ever actually going to space? If you only consider the knowledge of space to be facts about its physical properties -zero gravity, lack of oxygen, etc- then you will say 'yes'. You might have a physicalist mind. However, if you believe that the experience of being in space can never be obtained by simply reading facts about the same because there is more to it then you will say 'no'. You might be a firm believer in Qualia.
Logically speaking, the physicalist approach to knowledge is much easier to accept as the other argues that it will never be possible for us to fully know anything. What we consider complete knowledge helps us estimate the accuracy of our understanding of any concept as members of a vast and complicated universe.
Bibliography:
Ted-Ed. "Mary's Room: A philosophical thought experiment - Eleanor Nelsen" YouTube. 24 Jan, 2017. Video. 30 Sep, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGYmiQkah4o>
Nida-Rümelin, Martine and O Conaill, Donnchadh. "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 3 Sep, 2002. Web. 30 Sep, 2022. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#TwoVersArgu>
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